Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1999

The State of Utah v. Curtis John Miller : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Edwin Stanton Wall; Wall Law Offices; Attorney for Defendant-Appellant.
Jeffrey Buckner; Assistant Attorney General; Jan graham; Utah Attorney General; Terry
Christiansen; Assistant Salt Lake District Attorney; Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah v. Miller, No. 990417 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1999).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/2176

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

Case No. 990417-CA

CURTIS JOHN MILLER,

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

APPEAL FROM CONVICTIONS OF BURGLARY, A SECOND DEGREE
FELONY IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-202 (SUPP.
1999), AND THEFT, A SECOND DEGREE FELONY IN VIOLATION
OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-412 (SUPP. 1999), IN THE THIRD
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE
OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE PAT B. BRIAN, PRESIDING

EDWIN STANTON WALL
WALL LAW OFFICES
800 Mclntyre Building
68 S. Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone (801) 523-3445
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

JEFFREY BUCKNER (4546)
Assistant Attorney General
JAN GRAHAM (1231)
Utah Attorney General
160 E. 200 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854
Telephone: (801) 366-0180
TERRY CHRISTIANSEN
Assistant Salt Lake District
Attorney
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

NO ORAL ARGUMENT OR PUBLISHED OPINION REQUESTED
H 1 En!>Ianla#
l

fPfpfift§

mmdm
**otk of the Court

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

Case No. 990417-CA

CURTIS JOHN MILLER,

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

APPEAL FROM CONVICTIONS OF BURGLARY, A SECOND DEGREE
FELONY IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-202 (SUPP.
1999), AND THEFT, A SECOND DEGREE FELONY IN VIOLATION
OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-412 (SUPP. 1999), IN THE THIRD
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE
OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE PAT B. BRIAN, PRESIDING

EDWIN STANTON WALL
WALL LAW OFFICES
800 Mclntyre Building
68 S. Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone (801) 523-3445
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

JEFFREY BUCKNER (4546)
Assistant Attorney General
JAN GRAHAM (1231)
Utah Attorney General
160 E. 200 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854
Telephone: (801) 366-0180
TERRY CHRISTIANSEN
Assistant Salt Lake District
Attorney
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

NO ORAL ARGUMENT OR PUBLISHED OPINION REQUESTED

TABLE

OF

CONTENTS

Pa
TABLE

OF AUTHORITIES

.

JURISDICTION
ISSUES
Sr"-'

•

PRESENTED
-•

AND

=••---.

~ —'

STANDARDS

. .- REVIEW

-;AL P R O V I S I O N S

STATEMENT OF Z+'£ She
S ^ : -. T V T .._

.. F A C T S

SUMMARY 05' ARGUMENT
ARGUMENT
I.

THEFT ^ :.~- .-. - ^ . • L R INCLUDED OFFENoL .
BURGLAPV; "-!F m W0 OFFENSES DO NOT MERGE

II.

DEFENDANT'S BURGLARY CONVICTION WAS ... .,
BY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE

•--.

III. DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE PLAIN ERROR
WHEN HE IDENTIFIED NO JURORS HE CLAIMS WERE
BIASED, WHEN THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT LIMIT
QUESTIONING AND GRANTED ALL OF HIS CHALLENGES
FOR CAUSE AND WHEN HE PASSED THE JURY FOR
~-/;SE
. . . . .
IV.

DEFENDANT'S THEFT .ONVICTION WAS SUPPORTED
3Y SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE
A.

Defendant's Burglary Conviction Was
Supported By Sufficient Evidence
Because He Stole Firearms
....
The Value Of The Stolen Property Was
Supported By Sufficient Evidence . .
The Vehicle Was Operable

CONCLUSION

1

ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION NOT REQUESTED
ADDENDUM A

- Statutes

23

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
STATE CASES
Duran v. Cook, 788 P.2d 1038 (Utah App. 1990) .. 1, 9, 10, 11, 12
People v. Hancock, 186 Colo. 30, 525 P.2d 435 (1974)

10

Promax Development Corp. v. Mattson, 943 P.2d 247
(Utah App. 1997)

12

State v. Baker. 671 P.2d 152 (Utah 1983)

8, 9, 11

State v. Bradley, 752 P.2d 874 (Utah 1985)

10

State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155 (Utah 1989),
cert, denied by 497 U.S. 1024, 110 S. Ct. 3270 (1990)
and habeas corpus denied by Bullock v. Carver, 910
F. Supp. 551 (D. Utah 1995)

16

State v. Day. 815 P.2d 1345 (Utah App. 1991)

18

State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993)
State v. Franklin, 735 P.2d 34 (Utah 1987)
State v. Hawkins, 967 P.2d 966 (Utah App. 1998)
State v. Hill. 674 P.2d 96 (Utah 1983)
State v. Loaan. 563 P.2d 811 (Utah 1977)
«<-**•» <*•

T.r.nr 966 P.2d 278 (Utah App. 1998)

State v. Pianaiakaone. 954 P.2d 861 (Utah 1998)
State v. Pitta. 728 P.2d 113 (Utah 1986)

2, 9
9
13
8, 9, 10
20, 21
20
18
8, 11

State v. Porter. 705 P.2d 1174 (Utah 1985)

13

State v. Price. 827 P.2d 247, 248 Utah App. 1992

18

State v. Pur cell. 711 P. 243 (Utah 1983)

21

iii

State v. Slowe, 728 P.2d 110 (Utah 1986)
State v. Viail, 840 P.2d 788 (Utah App. 1992)

20
2, 3, 12

State v. Viail, 922 P.2d 15 (Utah App. 1996)

18

State v. Yates, 834 P.2d 599 (Utah App. 1992)

18

STATE STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. §41-la-203 (Supp. 1999)

22

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-101 (Supp. 1999)

21

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (Supp. 1999)

1, 3, 11

Utah Code Ann. §76-6-404 (Supp. 1999)

3, 11

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412 (Supp. 1999)

1, 2, 20

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (1996)

1

Utah R. App. P. 24

18

Utah R. Crim. P. 18

3

Utah R. Evid. 404

15
OTHER AUTHORITIES

MERRIAM-WEBSTERS COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (10th ed, 1994)

iv

22

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 990417-CA
CURTIS JOHN MILLER,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION
Curtis Miller appeals from convictions of burglary, a second
degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (Supp.
1999) and theft, a second degree felony in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-6-412 (Supp. 1999).

(R. 129). The court of appeals

has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 782a-3(2)(e)(1996).
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Issue 1.

Should defendant's theft conviction merge into his

burglary conviction when this court has expressly held that the
two offenses do not merge as a matter of law?
Standard of Review.

Whether a crime is a lesser included

offense of another is a question of law reviewed for correctness.
Duran v. Cook, 788 P.2d 1038, 1040-41 (Utah App. 1990) (holding
theft does not merge with burglary) .

Issue 2.

Was the burglary conviction supported by

sufficient evidence when defendant was caught with stolen
property, knew it was stolen and was selling it, had a motive and
opportunity to steal it and the stolen property found in his
possession was last seen in the victim's cabin?
Standard of Review.

To prevail on a challenge to the

sufficiency of the evidence, an appellant has the burden of
marshaling all the evidence that supports the verdict, and then
showing that, when viewed in the light most favorable to the
verdict, the evidence is insufficient.

State v. Vigil, 840 P.2d

788, 792 (Utah App. 1992)(citations omitted).
Issue 3.
not sua sponte

Does a trial court commit plain error when it does
ask voir dire questions not requested by

defendant?
Standard of Review.

To prevail under plain error, a

defendant must show that 1) error exists, 2) the error should
have been obvious to the trial court, and 3) the error was
harmful, i.e, that absent the error, there is a reasonable
likelihood that the verdict would have been different.

State v.

Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993).
Issue 4.

Was defendant's theft conviction supported by

sufficient evidence?
Standard of Review.

To prevail on a challenge to the

sufficiency of the evidence, an appellant has the burden of

2

marshaling all the evidence that supports the verdict, and then
showing that, when viewed in the light most favorable to the
verdict, the evidence is insufficient.

Vigil, 840 P.2d at 792.

STATUTES, RULES, CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The following relevant constitutional provisions, statutes
or rules are included in Addendum A as: Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6202, -404, -412 (Supp. 1999); Utah R. Crim. P. 18.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On May 27, 1998, Curtis Miller was arrested by Salt Lake
County Sheriff's Deputies after they recovered stolen property
from his van.

(R. 236, 241). Defendant was charged with one

count of burglary and eleven counts of theft.

(R. 1-6). After a

preliminary hearing, defendant was bound over for trial on the
burglary charge and on one count of theft.

(R. 10-12).

On March 24, 1999, a jury convicted defendant of both
charges.

(R. 89, 111-13).

After his conviction, defendant was

sentenced to two concurrent prison terms of 1 to 15 years.

(R.

122-23).
Defendant timely appealed his convictions.

(R. 129).

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Crimes
On Wednesday, May 27, 1998, around 1:00 p.m., five deputies
from the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office were dispatched to a
westside neighborhood to watch for possible criminal activity
3

after receiving a report from a confidential informant that
defendant was selling stolen property.

(R. H A 75, 223-24, 232) .

Fifteen minutes after the deputies arrived, defendant and David
Christianson left a home, boarded a white panel van and drove
about half a block north where they met two Hispanic males in a
Ford Escort.

(R. 225-27, 258; State's Exhibit 1). Defendant

handed some boxes to the Hispanic males from the back of his van
and the two men placed the boxes into the trunk of the Ford.

(R.

228) .
Before driving away, the Hispanic males removed a license
plate from a Mercedes Benz parked on the road and placed it on
defendant's van, which had no license plate up to that time.
229-30).

(R.

After defendant drove off in the van, deputies ran a

license plate check.

(R. 236). When they found no positive

match, deputies stopped defendant for a registration violation.
(R. 71, 228, 235-36, 245) .
After the stop, deputies obtained defendant's permission to
search the van and found nine firearms, two generators and a 1996
Honda 4-runner.

(R. 72, 228, 236-38, 246, 250, 253; State's

Exhibits 2-5). A VIN check on the 4-runner named Patsy Dorrans
(Mrs. Dorrans), an employee of Salt Lake City metro jail, as the
owner.

(R. 239B, 257; Exhibit 6). Mrs. Dorrans had bought the

4-runner about a year earlier and was unaware that the property
had been stolen.

(R. 239B-40, 258-59).

4

When questioned, defendant said the van was his, but
confessed the property inside the van was stolen.

(R. 252).

Defendant offered no explanation for how he got the stolen
property, but claimed that the Dorrans had cheated him out of
$5,000 in a land deal.

(R. 252-53).

Meanwhile, other deputies

recovered a satellite dish, a satellite dish system and a
generator from the Hispanic males in the Ford Escort.

(R. 75-76,

228, 249). Deputies learned that defendant had sold the Hispanic
males the property for $300.

(R. 232, 250).

Defendant and Christianson were arrested and taken to jail
where deputies found burglary tools on Christianson.
254-55).

(R. 236,

The registration to the 4-runner was found in

defendant's pocket.

(R. 240). Before it was stolen, the 4-

runner was stored along with the other property in the Dorrans'
cabin in Echo Canyon.

(R. 239B, 259-60, 269). In the ensuing

investigation, Summit County Sheriff's Office deputies found the
sliding doors to the cabin ajar, but no sign of forced entry.
(R. 265-66, 275-76).

However, neighbors had seen defendant

leaving the Dorrans' property days before his arrest.

(R. 270,

272-73) .
Defendant owned land near the Dorrans' cabin and Mrs.
Dorrans confirmed that defendant had unsuccessfully sued them
over a land dispute in late 1997.

(R. 264-65, 271). Six months

before the lawsuit, defendant had worked on the roof of the

5

Dorrans' trailer near the cabin.

(R. 257, 270-71, 272). Because

the tools needed for the roofing job were kept in the cabin,
defendant either had a set of keys to the cabin, knew where the
keys were kept or knew the code to the keyless entry.
268, 271-72).

(R. 261,

After the lawsuit, defendant no longer had

permission to be on the Dorrans' property.1 (R. 261-62, 270).
The Dorrans had spent the 1998 Memorial Day weekend at their
cabin.

(R. 266). The stolen property was in their cabin at the

time they left for home.

(R. 267). The cabin was secured by a

keyless entry downstairs and a lock upstairs.
extra key was kept on the porch.

(R. 261). An

(R. 276). The registration to

the 4-runner was kept in the jockey box of the vehicle.
259).

(R.

The firearms found in defendant's van had been kept in a

safe in the basement garage of the cabin together with the 4runner.

(R. 259-60).

Except for a couple of TV sets, a revolver and some sanders,
police recovered most of the Dorrans' stolen property.
269).

(R. 263,

The property was valued at $9,935, but Mrs. Dorrans

estimated the replacement cost would have exceeded $10,000.

(R.

85, 263).

l

The Dorrans initially knew defendant through a mutual
friend, but they did not know Christianson and never gave him
permission to be on their property. (R. 260-62). Christianson
was also convicted of burglary in a separate trial. (R. 268-69).
6

Jury Selection
After obtaining general background information about the
potential jurors, the trial court asked if any of them knew
either the prosecutor or defense counsel.

(R. 178-79, 194-98) .

The trial court then asked whether any of the potential jurors
knew the defendant, knew any of the witnesses or had any
immediate family members or very close friends in law
enforcement.

(R. 198-99).

Next, the trial court asked if any of

the potential jurors had been a victim of a crime, such as a
break-in, an assault, or a robbery.

(R. 205-08).

The trial

court then asked if any of the potential jurors or their
immediate family members had ever been accused, arrested or
prosecuted for any criminal offense.

(R. 208-11).

The trial

court followed up by asking if those experiences would prevent
them from being fair and impartial.

(R. 211).

After completing voir dire, the trial court dismissed, on
stipulation of counsel, six potential jurors for cause: Caffery,
Jawgiel, Phillips, Plonsker, Ross and Williams.

(R. 89, 211-12).

The State used its four peremptory challenges on Bolliger,
Butler, Clardy and Price.

(R. 89). Defendant excused Nielsen,

Novelle, Rowley and Trussel with his peremptory challenges.
8 9).

(R.

Defendant then passed the remaining jury panel for cause:
The Court: . . . All right. Now to the
prosecutor, do we pass for cause on the
remaining jurors?
7

Mr. Christiansen: Yes, your Honor.
The Court: To the defense counsel, do you
pass for cause on the remaining jurors?
Mr. Lish: Yes, your honor.
(R. 216).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This court has held that theft is not a lesser included
offense of burglary.

The offenses, therefore, do not merge.

Defendant's convictions should also be affirmed for the
additional reason that they were supported by sufficient
evidence.

His theft of firearms alone provided an independent

basis to convict and the State presented evidence of value and
operability of the 4-runner.

Finally, defendant failed to

establish how his conviction should be overturned on grounds
plain error when he failed to establish juror bias.
ARGUMENT
I.

THEFT IS NOT A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE
OF BURGLARY; THE TWO OFFENSES DO NOT
MERGE

Defendant seeks reversal of his theft conviction, arguing
that theft is a lesser included offense of burglary that should
have merged into the burglary conviction.
14-15).

(Appellant's Br. at

Defendant relies on State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152 (Utah

1983), State v. Pitts. 728 P.2d 113 (Utah 1986), and State v.
Hill, 674 P.2d 96 (Utah 1983) to support his argument.
8

(Appellant's Br. at 14-15).

Because he did not preserve this

issue below, defendant asks this Court to review the issue for
plain error.

Ld. at 14.

To prevail under a theory of plain error, a defendant must
show that 1) error exists, 2) the error should have been obvious
to the trial court, and 3) there is a reasonable likelihood that,
absent the error, the verdict would have been different.
v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993).

State

Because this Court

expressly held, in Duran v. Cook, 788 P.2d 1038, 1040-41 (Utah
App. 1990), that burglary and theft do not merge, defendant has
failed to show the existence of any error, much less obvious
error.
In Duran, this Court applied a two-step analysis of the
merger claim defendant now asserts on appeal.

The "principal

test", this Court declared, involves "a comparison of the
statutory elements of each crime."

Ici. at 1040 (quoting State v.

Hill, 674 P.2d 96, 97 (Utah 1983)).

"[W]here the two crimes are

*such that the greater cannot be committed without necessarily
having committed the lesser,' . . . then as a matter of law they
stand in the relationship of greater and lesser offenses, and the
defendant cannot be convicted or punished for both."

Duran, 674

P.2d at 1040 (citing State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152, 156 (Utah
1983)); see also State v. Franklin, 735 P.2d 34, 35-36 (Utah
1987)(no double jeopardy where each offense requires proof of a
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fact that the other does not)(citing Blockburaer v. United
States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932)); People v. Hancock, 186 Colo. 30,
525 P.2d 435, 438 (1974) (en banc) (an offense is lesser included
when it is impossible to commit the greater offense without also
having satisfied every essential element of the lesser offense).
However, a theoretical comparison of the elements may not be
sufficient to resolve all merger claims, especially where the
crimes involve multiple variations " . . . since a greater-lesser
relationship may exist between some variations of the crimes and
not others/'

Duran, 788 P.2d at 1040 (citing Hill, 674 P.2d at

97 (theoretical comparison insufficient for theft and multiple
variation crime of aggravated robbery)); and citing State v.
Bradley, 752 P.2d 874, 877 (Utah 1985) (theoretical comparison
insufficient for aggravated burglary and multiple variation crime
of aggravated assault)).

In those situations, the appellate

court examines the evidence "to determine whether the greaterlesser relationship exists between the specific variations of the
crimes actually proved at trial/'

Hill, 674 P.2d at 97.

Nevertheless, the court looks at the facts only when a
theoretical comparison of the elements of the crimes is
insufficient to resolve the issue.
Applying that two-step analysis, this Court held in Duran
that theft is not a lesser included offense of burglary and,
therefore, does not merge.

Ld. 788 P.2d at 1040-41 (citations
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omitted).

This Court reasoned that separate convictions for both

burglary and theft were constitutional because burglary could be
committed without necessarily committing a theft.

Ld. at 1040.

Thus, this Court resolved the merger issue on a theoretical
comparison between the two crimes alone.

Id. at 1040-41.

In reaching this conclusion, the Duran court compared the
statutory elements of each crime as well as the range of possible
classifications.

For example, Duran noted that burglary is

committed when a person "enters or remains unlawfully in a
building or any portion of a building with intent to commit a
felony or theft or commit an assault on any person."

Duran, 788

P.2d at 1040; see also Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202(a)(Supp. 1999).
In contrast, theft is committed when a person "obtains or
exercises unauthorized control over the property of another with
a purpose to deprive him thereof/'

Duran, 788 P.2d at 1040; Utah

Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (Supp. 1999).

Burglary is classified as

either a second or third degree felony, while theft can range in
seriousness from a class B misdemeanor to a second degree felony.
Duran, 788 P.2d at 1040; Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (Supp. 1999).
Although this Court noted some overlap between the two crimes, it
also recognized that actual completion of the theft is not a
necessary element of burglary.2

id. at 1040.

2

Duran further distinguished Baker and Pitts, noting that
those cases discussed the greater-lesser offense determinations
in the context of requested jury instructions on uncharged lesser
11

Duran controls.

Defendant could properly be convicted of

both burglary and theft as a matter of law.

Thus, defendant has

not shown any error, much less plain error.
II.

DEFENDANT'S BURGLARY CONVICTION WAS
SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE

Defendant alleges his burglary conviction was not supported
by sufficient evidence.

(Appellant's Br. at 15-17).

Specifically, defendant claims there was no evidence that he ever
entered or remained unlawfully in the cabin over the Memorial Day
weekend with the intent to commit a theft.

Ici. at 15.

Defendant's chief complaint is that Mrs. Dorrans only speculated
as to how he entered the cabin, Id. at 17, and he suggests her
testimony was the only evidence linking him to the burglary.
Because defendant failed to marshal all the evidence supporting
his burglary conviction, his sufficiency challenge fails.
To prevail on a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence, an appellant has the burden of marshaling all the
evidence that supports the verdict, and then showing that, when
viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence
is insufficient.

State v. Vigil. 840 P.2d 788, 792 (Utah App.

1992) (citations omitted).

Appellant may not simply reargue his

position using only selected excerpts of the evidence.

Promax

Dev. Corp. v. Mattson. 943 P.2d 247, 255 (Utah App. 1997).

included offenses.
omitted).

Duran, 788 P.2d at 1041 n. 2 (citations
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Appellate courts review the evidence and all reasonable
inferences which may be drawn therefrom in the light most
favorable to the verdict of the jury.

State v. Hawkins, 967 P.2d

966, 968 n.l (Utah App. 1998).
Direct evidence of most burglaries is rare.

Burglarious

intent "is usually inferred from circumstantial evidence: the
manner of entry, the time of day, the character and contents of
the building, the person's actions after entry, the totality of
the surrounding circumstances, and the intruder's explanation/'
State v. Porter, 705 P.2d 1174, 1177 (Utah 1985).

In this case,

defendant was linked to the burglary of the cabin by the manner
of entry, the character and content of the goods that were
stolen, the time of entry relative to when he was caught with the
Dorrans' property, and his conduct after the burglary.
Contrary to defendant's claims, his entry or presence in the
cabin with the intent to commit a theft was the only reasonable
inference supported by the evidence.

The stolen property had

been inside the cabin when the Dorrans left for home after the
Memorial Day weekend.

A few days later, deputies discovered the

same property in defendant's van.

Defendant had been selling the

property and had the registration to the 4-runner in his pocket.
Defendant knew the property was stolen, but offered no
explanation how he got it.

He simply tried to justify his

actions by explaining that the Dorrans owed him $5000.

13

The

Dorrans never acknowledged the debt nor gave the defendant
permission to enter the cabin and take their things.

Because the

stolen property came from the cabin, the only reasonable
inference as to how the property could get from their cabin to
defendant's van is if someone burglarized the cabin.
Defendant was the only person who had a reason for
burglarizing the cabin.
the Dorrans.

Christianson was a complete stranger to

Defendant believed the Dorrans owed him money.

sued them because he thought they had cheated him.

He

He wanted to

get even, and his belief in the existence of a debt provided him
a motive to steal their property.

Besides motive, defendant had

the opportunity to steal their property.

Defendant had been seen

on the Dorrans' property a few days before the property was found
in his van.

Because he was present on the Dorrans' property

without their knowledge or consent (R. 273), the jury could
reasonably infer defendant's purpose for being there was to do
something illegal.

Those suspicions were confirmed when

defendant was caught with the Dorrans' property.
Defendant's possession of the Dorrans' property was not his
first contact with them or their property.
and worked on their roof.
in the cabin.

He knew the Dorrans

The tools he needed for the job were

Defendant needed a way to get into the cabin to

get the tools and either had keys, knew where they were kept, or
had some other means of access.

Defendant's possession of keys

14

or ready access to the cabin explains why there was no forced
entry and why he never needed to use the burglary tools found on
Christianson.
By having been in the Dorrans' cabin in the past, defendant
was also familiar with its contents.

He knew where the guns were

kept and that the safe would not be locked.

(R. 268). By having

been on their property over the Memorial Day weekend, defendant
knew when the Dorrans would be gone.

Because defendant was

driving the van with the stolen property, the jury could
reasonably infer that he was in charge of the burglary.

Finally,

because defendant was willing to sell the stolen property and
steal a license plate from another car, the jury further could
infer he was knowingly involved in the criminal activity which he
was trying to conceal.

Utah R. Evid. 404(b).

Defendant claims the trial court committed plain error by
allowing Mrs. Dorrans to speculate, on direct examination, as to
the possible manner of entry.

Defendant cannot complain,

however, about Mrs. Dorrans' response when he did not object to
it and then invited the same response on cross-examination.

On

cross examination, Mrs. Dorrans testified that defendant had keys
and knew where they were.
Q. But you also testified that you'd given
him the combo to the keyless door lock and
possibly the location of the keys to you[r]
cabin?

15

A. He had the keys. He knew where the keys
were because he did some work up there.
(R. 267).
Because defendant elicited the same testimony on crossexamination that he now challenges on direct, any supposed error
was invited.
invited error.

Defendant cannot obtain appellate review of an
State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 159 (Utah 1989)

cert, denied by 497 U.S. 1024, 110 S. Ct. 3270 (1990) and habeas
corpus denied by Bullock v. Carver, 910 F. Supp. 551 (D. Utah
1995).

In any case, defendant failed to demonstrate prejudice.

Even without her testimony on the issue, the jury could infer
that defendant was familiar with how to enter the cabin because
he had worked for the Dorrans on their trailer in the past and he
had access to the cabin to obtain the tools needed to do the job.
The evidence, therefore, was sufficient to prove that
defendant burglarized the cabin.
III. DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE
PLAIN ERROR WHEN HE IDENTIFIED NO JURORS
HE CLAIMS WERE BIASED, WHEN THE TRIAL
COURT DID NOT LIMIT QUESTIONING AND
GRANTED ALL OF HIS CHALLENGES FOR CAUSE
AND WHEN HE PASSED THE JURY FOR CAUSE
Defendant claims the trial court committed plain error in
its voir dire of the potential jurors because the examination was
purportedly inadequate to resolve doubts about possible juror
bias.

(Appellant's Br. at 19). Specifically, defendant claims

the trial court should have asked additional questions when some
16

of the potential jurors disclosed, what he claims to be, a "close
association" with the prosecuting attorney, law enforcement or
witnesses and when potential jurors disclosed that they had been
the victims of crimes or had family or friends who had been
involved in the criminal justice system,

id.

Defendant also

claims the trial court committed plain error by failing to ask
other follow up questions, such as whether any of the potential
jurors would give more credibility, weight or favor to the
witness for the prosecution because of their alleged association.
Defendant asserts that the trial court made no effort to
determine whether any potential jurors had "light" or "strong and
deep" impressions which would affect their impartiality.

Id.

Because the issue was not preserved below, defendant asks this
court to review the issue under a plain error standard.
Although defendant criticizes the trial court's questioning,
he fails to identify any juror whom he believes was improperly
impaneled.

Defendant merely suggests the possibility of improper

juror bias with a fifteen-page string cite to the trial
transcript.

Id. at 19.

The string cite is misleading because it

does not distinguish between those potential jurors who were
actually impaneled and those who were not.

A careful reading of

the string cite combined with the list of jurors reveals only
three people who were ever impaneled.

(R. 89, 194-211).

The

remainder of the persons in the string cite were either not
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impaneled or cannot be identified and defendant does not claim
that any of the unidentified persons were actually impaneled.
Without knowing whom defendant now challenges or why, the
issue is not adequately briefed.

This court has repeatedly

refused to consider arguments not adequately briefed.

State v.

Yates, 834 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah App. 1992); State v. Price, 827
P.2d 247, 248 Utah App. 1992); State v. Day, 815 P.2d 1345, 1351
(Utah App. 1991) . In oft quoted language condemning inadequate
briefs, this Court has said "[i]t is well settled that an
appellate court is not *a depository in which the appealing party
may dump the burden of argument and research."7

State v. Vigil,

922 P.2d 15, 25 (Utah App. 1996)(citations omitted); see also
Utah R. App. P. 24(a) (9) (argument shall contain the contentions
and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues
presented).
Defendant's challenge to the adequacy of voir dire by the
trial court fails for the additional reason that this issue
typically arises when a trial court refuses to ask additional
questions proposed by defense counsel.

See e.g. State v.

Piansiaksone, 954 P.2d 861, 866-68 (Utah 1998)(citations
omitted).

In this case, defendant never proposed any additional

questions and the trial court never denied the request.

By

arguing plain error on appeal, defendant essentially argues that
the trial court had an affirmative duty to divine additional

18

questions on behalf of defense counsel, especially those
questions that may have proved more helpful after an unfavorable
outcome at trial.

Defendant cites no authority for that

proposition and the State has found none.

Therefore, no error

exists, let alone obvious error.
Finally, defendant cannot show prejudice because the trial
court granted the stipulated challenges for cause, no additional
challenges for cause were denied, and defendant passed the jury
panel for cause.

Moreover, as stated above, defendant identifies

no juror he claims was biased.
IV.

DEFENDANT'S THEFT CONVICTION WAS
SUPPORTED RY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE

Defendant seeks reversal of his second degree felony theft
conviction for two reasons: first, he argues the State failed to
produce evidence of the market value of the stolen property;
second, he argues the State failed to present evidence that the
4-runner was operable.

Both arguments are irrelevant because the

theft of the firearms alone provided an independent basis for a
conviction.

Furthermore, the value of the property and the

operability of the 4-runner were supported by sufficient
evidence.
A.

Defendant'3 Burglary Conviction Was
Supported By Sufficient Evidence
Because He Stole Firearms

Second degree felony theft includes the theft of property
valued at $5,000 or more, theft of a firearm or theft of an
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operable motor vehicle.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412(1) (a) (i) ,

(ii) (Supp. 1999) . Since defendant could be convicted of second
degree felony theft for stealing the firearms alone regardless of
their value, whether the total property was valued at $5,000 or
more or whether the 4-runner was an operable motor vehicle is
irrelevant.
Defendant does not dispute that the firearms he possessed
were stolen.

Moreover, as explained above, the evidence was

sufficient to prove that defendant committed the theft.

The

State, therefore, was not required to prove either the value of
the property stolen or that the vehicle was operable.
B.

The Value Of The Stolen Property
Was Supported By Sufficient
Evidence

Even if the total value of the property were relevant, there
was sufficient evidence that its value exceeded $5,000. Defendant
claims the State only proved the replacement cost of the stolen
property, but not its market value.

(Appellant's Br. at 23).

Defendant also argues that Mrs. Dorrans could not testify to the
property's value as she was not the one who prepared the values
on the itemized list and she did not adopt them as her own. Id.
at 23. Defendant cites State v. Logan. 563 P.2d 811 (Utah 1977)f
State v. Lvman, 966 P.2d 278 (Utah App. 1998), and State v.
Slowe, 728 P.2d H O

(Utah 1986) as support.

Defendant's

arguments are without merit for the following reasons:
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In Logan, the Utah Supreme Court declared market value to be
the appropriate standard for determining the value of stolen
property not otherwise provided by statute.
813.

Logan, 563 P.2d at

The Utah Supreme Court has also held that an owner is

presumed to be familiar with the value of his possessions and is
competent to testify on the present market value of his property.
State v. Purcell, 711 P. 243, 245 (Utah 1983).

The statute on

which Logan relied, however, required the property to be totally
destroyed as a condition precedent to a determination of market
value and, in the alternative, allowed value to be determined by
replacement cost if market value cannot be determined.

Ld. at

813; see also Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-101(4)(Supp. 1999).
In this case, the goods were not totally destroyed because
the Dorrans recovered most of them. (R. 264). During trial, Mrs.
Dorrans was shown a list of the goods along with the values.
Although neither she nor her husband personally "arrived at" the
values, Mrs. Dorrans said the numbers were very conservative and
the goods would have cost more than $10,000 to replace, id.

The

fact that the identity of the preparer was unknown and that no
one else testified as to the value or the condition of the
property is irrelevant because Mrs. Dorrans was presumed to know
the value of her property.

Her testimony confirmed that the

value of her property exceeded $5,000.

Defendant presented no

contrary evidence to rebut that presumption; nor did he show that
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she did not know the values or that the values were somehow less
or even different from what she testified to.
Finally, defendant in effect acknowledged that the value of
the goods equaled or exceeded the $5,000 statutory minimum when
he tried to justify the theft by telling the police that the
Dorrans owed him at least that much.

Defendant, in effect,

assumed the role of willing buyer and seller in taking what he
apparently believed to be the equivalent value of the $5,000 debt
he claimed they owed him.
Therefore, the value of the stolen goods was supported by
sufficient evidence.
C

The Vehicle Was Operable

Likewise, sufficient evidence supported the reasonable
inference that the 4-runner was operable.

Defendant equates

"operable" with whether the vehicle was driveable.

Although a

driveable vehicle is operable, the word "operable" encompasses
more.

Operable means "fit, possible, or desirable to use:

practicable."

MERRIAM-WEBSTERS COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (10th ed.

1994).
Evidence that the vehicle was operable is supported by
reasonable inference.

First, the vehicle had been registered.

See Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-203 et seq. (Supp. 1999)(vehicle must
pass safety inspection to be registered).

Second, the Dorrans

bought the 4-runner only a year before the theft and the vehicle
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was valued at approximately $5,000.

If the vehicle was not

operable, the value would have been much less.

Third, if the 4

runner was inoperable, defendant would likely have left it in t
garage when he burglarized the cabin.
For these reasons, there was sufficient evidence that the
vehicle was operable.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the State respectfully requests
that defendant's convictions be affirmed.
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION NOT REQUESTED
The State requests neither oral argument nor a published
opinion in this appeal as it does not raise any novel or
important issues.
Respectfully submitted this

f()

day of July, 2000.

JAN GRAHAM
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL

^MMy^Buckner
Assistant Attorney General
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76-6-205

(a) "Communication device" means any device mclud^ ' This section does not create any separate offense but
^ g a telephone cellular telephone computer or radio, provi^ e g a n e n h a n c e d penalty for the primary offense
1998
Much may be used in an attempt to summon police fire,
Medical or other emergency aid
PART 2
(b) "Emergency means any situation in which
(1) property or human health or safety is in jeopBURGLARY AND CRIMINAL TRESPASS
ardy, and
(n) the prompt summoning of aid is essential to the 7 6 - 6 ^ 0 1 Definitions.
preservation of the property or human safety or
^°* the purposes of this part
health
(1) "Building,' m addition to its ordinary meaning,
'*> A person is guilty of damage to or interruption of a
^ieans any watercraft, aircraft, trailer, sleepmg car, or
c o m m u n i c a t l o n device if the actor attempts to prohibit or
°ther structure or vehicle adapted for overnight accomJBter^upt, o r prohibits or interrupts, another persons use of
modation of persons or for carrying on business therein
comi
^unication equipment when the other person is attempt^ l d includes
*££ ™* summon emergency aid or has communicated a desire to
8umx
(a) each separately secured or occupied portion of
^ o n emergency aid, and in the process the actor
the structure or vehicle, and
(a) uses force, intimidation, or any other form of vio(b) each structure appurtenant to or connected
^nce,
with the structure or vehicle
(b) destroys, disables or damages communication
(2) "Dwelling" means a building which is usually occu^ u i p m e n t or
pied by a person lodging therein at night, whether or not
(c) commits any other act in an attempt to prohibit or
^ person is actually present
**\terrupt the person s use of a communication device to
(3) A person "enters or remains unlawfully" in or upon
JUmmon emergency aid
Premises when the premises or any portion thereof at the
y ' Damage to or interruption of a communication device is
^ m e of the entry or remaining are not open to the public
atua^ g misdemeanor
1998
^nd when the actor is not otherwise licensed or privileged
™"^Vftft Ottenses committed
a g a i n s t frinoer, mining;
^ enter or remain on the premises or such portion
or agricultural i n d u s t r i e s — E n h a n c e d penalhereof
ties.
(4) "Enter" means
1
, * ' A person who commits any criminal offense with the
(a) intrusion of any part of the body; or
m en
* ^ to halt, impede, obstruct, or interfere with the lawful
(b) intrusion of any physical object under control of
JjJ^^ement, cultivation, or harvesting of trees or timber, or
the actor
1973
ft? Management or operations of agricultural or mining
™ u s ^ n e s 1S subject to an enhanced penalty for the offense as
Burglary.
provi^ e( j below However, this section does not apply to action
'*' A person is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains
unla\VfuUy in a building or any portion of a building with
P ^ ^ e d by the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U S C
™k$*n 151 et s e q , or the Federal Railway Labor Act, 45 intent t o c o m m i t a felony or theft or commit an assault on any
perso^
?*? Section 151 et seq
'*' (a) The prosecuting attorney, or grand jury if an indict(*' Burglary is a felony of the third degree unless it was
ment is returned, shall cause to be subscribed upon the c o m n *itted in a dwelling, m which event it is a felony of the
c
1973
^mplaint in misdemeanor cases or the information or secon^ d e g r e e
^ d i c t m e n t in felony cases notice that the defendant is
s
Aggravated burglary*
Ubject to the enhanced penalties provided under this
s
is guilty of aggravated burglary if m attempt^ction The notice shall be in a clause separate from and m ^ ' Ao mperson
mi m
^' .^
t t £ > o r fleeing from a burglary the actor or
^ addition to the substantive offense charged
(b) If the subscription is not included initially, the court another participant in the crime
(a) causes bodily injury to any person who is not a
^ a y subsequently allow the prosecutor to amend the
Participant in the crime,
^Hargmg document to include the subscription if the court
(b) uses or threatens the immediate use of a dangerous
**nds the charging documents, including any statement of
w
eapon against any person who is not a participant in the
Ph)bable cause, provide notice to the defendant of the
c
h m e , or
^legation he committed the offense as described in Sub(c) possesses or attempts to use any explosive or dana c t i o n (1), or if the court finds the defendant has not
Serous weapon
°\herwise been substantially prejudiced by the omission
(3) The penalties are enhanced as provided in this subsec'** Aggravated burglary is a first degree felony
tion
^ As used in this section, "dangerous weapon" has the
1989
(a) a class C misdemeanor is a class B misdemeanor, same definition as under Section 76-1-601
w
i t h a mandatory fine of not less than $1,000, which is in
76-6-aQ4# Burglary of a v e h i c l e — Charge of other
a(
idition to any term of imprisonment the court may
lx
offense.
1ipose,
'*'
Any
person who unlawfully enters any vehicle with
(b) a class B misdemeanor is a Class A misdemeanor, intent
t felony or theft is guilty of a burglary of a
w
i t h a fine of not less than $2,500, which is in addition to vehiclgt 0 c o m m i a
^ y term of imprisonment the court may impose,
(*' Burglary of a vehicle is a class A misdemeanor
(c) a class A misdemeanor is a third degree felony, with
a
(*' A charge against any person for a violation of Subsection
fine of not less than $5,000, which is in addition to any
1 ^ 1 not preclude a charge for a commission of any other
^ r m of imprisonment the court may impose,
offens e
1978
(d) a third degree felony is a second degree felony, with
a
fine of not less than $7,500, which is m addition to any 76-6-2»Q5 Manufacture or p o s s e s s i o n of instrument for
^ r m of imprisonment the court may impose, and
burglary or theft.
(e) a second degree felony is subject to a fine of not less
j y person who manufactures or possesses any instrument,
" i a n $10,000, which is m addition to any term of lmpns- t 0 ° l ' Hevice, article, or other thing adapted, designed, or
0l
iment the court may impose
c o m m o n i v u g e ( j m advancing or facilitating t h e commission of
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(b) Fails to correct a false impression of law or fact
that the actor previously created or confirmed by
words or conduct that is likely to affect the judgment
of another and that the actor does not now believe to
be true, or
(c) Prevents another from acquiring information
likely to affect his judgment in the transaction, or
(d) Sells or otherwise transfers or encumbers property without disclosing a hen, security interest, adverse claim, or other legal impediment to the enjoyment of the property, whether the hen, security
interest, claim, or impediment is or is not valid or is
or is not a matter of official record, or
(e) Promises performance t h a t is likely to affect
the judgment of another in the transaction, which
performance the actor does not intend to perform or
knows will not be performed, provided, however, that
failure to perform the promise in issue without other
evidence of intent or knowledge is not sufficient proof
that the actor did not intend to perform or knew the
promise would not be performed
1973

76-6-402. Presumptions and defenses.
The following presumption shall be applicable to this part
(1) Possession of property recently stolen, when no
satisfactory explanation of such possession is made, shall
be deemed prima facie evidence that the person in possession stole the property
(2) It is no defense under this part that the actor has an
interest in the property or service stolen if another person
also has an interest that the actor is not entitled to
infringe, provided an interest in property for purposes of
this subsection shall not include a security interest for the
repayment of a debt or obligation
(3) It is a defense under this part that the actor
(a) Acted under an honest claim of right to the
property or service involved, or
(b) Acted in the honest belief that he had the right
to obtain or exercise control over the property or
service as he did, or
(c) Obtained or exercised control over the property
or service honestly believing that the owner, if
present, would have consented.
1974
76-6-403. Theft — Evidence to support accusation.
Conduct denominated theft in this part constitutes a single
offense embracing the separate offenses such as those heretofore known as larceny, larceny by trick, larceny by bailees,
embezzlement, false pretense, extortion, blackmail, receiving
stolen property An accusation of theft may be supported by
evidence that it was committed in any manner specified m
Sections 76-6-404 through 76-6-410 subject to the power of
the court to ensure a fair trial by granting a continuance or
other appropriate relief where the conduct of the defense
would be prejudiced by lack of fair notice or by surprise 1974
76-6-404. Theft — Elements.
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over the property of another with a purpose to
deprive him thereof
197s
76-6-404.5. Wrongful appropriation — Penalties.
(1) A person commits wrongful appropriation if he obtains
or exercises unauthorized control over the property of another,
without the consent of the owner or legal custodian and with
intent to temporarily appropriate, possess, or use the property
or to temporarily deprive the owner or legal custodian of
possession of the property
(2) The consent of the owner or legal custodian of the
property to its control by the actor is not presumed or implied

76-6-407

because of the owner's or legal custodians consent on a
previous occasion to the control of the property by any person
(3) Wrongful appropriation is punishable one degree lower
than theft, as provided in Section 76-6-412, so that a violation
which would have been
(a) a second degree felony under Section 76-6-412 if it
had been theft is a third degree felony if it is wrongful
appropnation,
(b) a third degree felony under Section 76-6-412 if it
had been theft is a class A misdemeanor if it is wrongful
appropnation,
(c) a class A misdemeanor under Section 76-6-412 if it
had been theft is a class B misdemeanor if it is wrongful
appropriation, and
(d) a class B misdemeanor under Section 76-6-412 if it
had been theft is a class C misdemeanor if it is wrongful
appropriation
1999

76-6-405. Theft by deception.
(1) A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises control
over property of another by deception and with a purpose to
deprive him thereof
(2) Theft by deception does not occur, however, when there
is only falsity as to matters having no pecuniary significance,
or puffing by statements unlikely to deceive ordinary persons
in the group addressed "Puffing" means an exaggerated
commendation of wares or worth in communications addressed to the public or to a class or group
1973

76-6-406. Theft by extortion.
( D A person is guilty of theft if he obtains or exercises
control over the property of another by extortion and with a
purpose to deprive him thereof
(2) As used m this section, extortion occurs when a person
threatens to
(a) Cause physical harm in the future to the person
threatened or to any other person or to property at any
time, or
(b) Subject the person threatened or any other person
to physical confinement or restraint, or
(c) Engage in other conduct constituting a crime, or
(d) Accuse any person of a crime or expose him to
hatred, contempt, or ridicule, or
(e) Reveal any information sought to be concealed by
the person threatened, or
(f) Testify or provide information or withhold testimony or information with respect to another's legal claim
or defense, or
(g) Take action as an official against anyone or anything, or withhold official action, or cause such action or
withholding, or
(h) Bring about or continue a strike, boycott, or other
similar collective action to obtain property which is not
demanded or received for the benefit of the group which
the actor purports to represent, or
(1) Do any other act which would not in itself substantially benefit him but which would harm substantially
any other person with respect to that person's health,
safety, business, calling, career, financial condition, reputation, or personal relationships
1973

76-6-407. Theft of lost, mislaid, or mistakenly delivered property.
A person commits theft when
(1) He obtains property of another which he knows to
have been lost or mislaid, or to have been delivered under
a mistake as to the identity of the recipient or as to the
nature or amount of the property, without taking reasonable measures to return it to the owner and
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section Reasonable expenses and costs include expenses and
costs for investigation, service calls employee time, and
equipment use
(2) Criminal prosecution under this section does not affect
the n g h t of a telecommunication service provider to b n n g a
civil action for redress for damages suffered as a result of the
commission of any of the acts prohibited by this section
(3) This section does not abridge or alter any other right,
action, or remedy otherwise available to a telecommunication
service provider
1996

76-6-410. Theft by person having custody of property
pursuant to repair or rental agreement.
A person is guilty of theft if
(1) Having custody of property pursuant to an agreement between himself or another and the owner thereof
whereby the actor or another is to perform for compensation a specific service for the owner involving the maintenance, repair, or use of such property, he intentionally
uses or operates it, without the consent of the owner, for
his own purposes in a manner constituting a gross deviation from the agreed purpose, or
(2) Having custody of any property pursuant to a rental
or lease agreement where it is to be returned m a specified
manner or at a specified time, intentionally fails to comply
with the terms of the agreement concerning return so as
to render such failure a gross deviation from the agreement
1973
76-6-411.

Repealed.

1974

76-6-412.

Theft — Classification of offenses — Action
for treble d a m a g e s .
(1) Theft of property and services as provided in this
chapter shall be punishable
(a) as a felony of the second degree if the
d) value of the property or services is or exceeds
$5,000,
(u) property stolen is a firearm or an operable
motor vehicle,
(in) actor is armed with a dangerous weapon, as
defined in Section 76-1-601, at the time of the theft, or
dv) property is stolen from the person of another,
(b) as a felony of the third degree if
(i) the value of the property or services is or
exceeds $1,000 but is less than $5,000,
(n) the actor has been twice before convicted of
theft, any robbery, or any burglary with intent to
commit theft, or
(in) in a case not amounting to a second-degree
felony, the property taken is a stallion, mare, colt,
gelding, cow, heifer, steer, ox, bull, calf, sheep, goat,
mule, jack, jenny, swine, poultry, or a fur-bearing
animal raised for commercial purposes,
(c) a s a class A misdemeanor if the value of the property
stolen is or exceeds $300 but is less t h a n $1,000, or
(d) as a class B misdemeanor if the value of the
property stolen is less than $300
(2) Any person who violates Subsection 76-6-408(1) or Section 76-6-413, or commits theft of property described in
Subsection 76-6-412(l)(b)(in), is civilly liable for three times
the amount of actual damages, if any sustained by the
plaintiff, and for costs of suit and reasonable attorneys' fees
1997

76-6-413. Release of fur-bearing animals — Penalty —
Finding.
(1) In any case not amounting to a felony of the second
degree, any person who intentionally and without permission
of the owner releases any fur-bearing animal raised for
commercial purposes is guilty of a felony of the third degree

76-6-505

(2) The Legislature finds that the release of fur-bearing
animals raised for commercial purposes subjects the animals
to unnecessary suffering through deprivation of food and
shelter and compromises their genetic integrity, thereby permanently depriving the owner of substantial value
1997
PART 5
FRAUD
76-6-501. Forgery — "Writing" defined.
(1) A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud
anyone, or with knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to be
perpetrated by anyone, he
(a) alters any writing of another without his authority
or utters any such altered writing, or
(b) makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues,
transfers, publishes, or utters any writing so that the
writing or the making, completion, execution, authentication, issuance, transference, publication or utterance purports to be the act of another, whether the person is
existent or nonexistent, or purports to have been executed
at a time or place or in a numbered sequence other than
was in fact the case, or to be a copy of an original when no
such Tmgmal existed
(2) As used m this section, "writing" includes printing,
electronic storage or transmission, or any other method of
recording valuable information including forms such as
(a) checks, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges,
trademarks, money, and any other symbols of value, right,
privilege, or identification,
(b) a security, revenue stamp, or any other instrument
or writing issued by a government or any agency, or
(c) a check, an issue of stocks, bonds, or any other
instrument or w n t m g representing an interest in or claim
against property, or a pecuniary interest m or claim
against any person or enterprise
(3) Forgery is a felony of the third degree
1996

76-6-502. Possession of forged writing or device for
writing.
Any person who, with intent to defraud, knowingly possesses any writing that is a forgery as defined in Section
76-6-501, or who with intent to defraud knowingly possesses
any device for making any such writing, is guilty of a felony of
the third degree, except where the altering, making, completion, execution, issuance, transfer, publication, or utterance of
such writing would constitute a class A misdemeanor, in which
event the possession of the writing or device for making such
a writing shall constitute a class A misdemeanor
1974
76-6-503. Fraudulent h a n d l i n g of recordable writings.
(1) Any person who with intent to deceive or injure anyone
falsifies, destroys, removes, or conceals any will, deed, mortgage, security instrument, or other writing for which the law
provides public recording is guilty of fraudulent handling of
recordable writings
(2) Fraudulent handling of recordable writings is a felony of
the third degree
1973
76-6-504. Tampering w i t h records.
(1) Any person who, having no privilege to do so, knowingly
falsifies, destroys, removes, or conceals any writing, other
than the writings enumerated in Section 76-6-503, or record,
public or private, with intent to deceive or injure any person or
to conceal any wrongdoing is guilty of tampering with records
(2) Tampering with records is a class B misdemeanor 1973
76-6-505. Issuing a bad c h e c k o r draft — P r e s u m p t i o n .
(1) Any person who issues or passes a check or draft for the
payment of money, for the purpose of obtaining from any
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(3) The prosecution shall offer evidence in support of the
charge,
(4) When the prosecution has rested, the defense may
present its case,
(5) Thereafter, the parties may offer only rebutting evidence unless the court, for good cause, otherwise permits,
(6) When the evidence is concluded and at any other appropriate time, the court shall instruct the jury; and
(7) Unless the cause is submitted to the jury on either side
or on both sides without argument, the prosecution shall open
the argument, the defense shall follow and the prosecution
may close by responding to the defense argument The court
may set reasonable limits upon the argument of counsel for
each party and the time to be allowed for argument.
(h) If a juror becomes ill, disabled or disqualified dunng
trial and an alternate juror has been selected, the case shall
proceed using the alternate juror If no alternate has been
selected, the parties may stipulate to proceed with the number
of jurors remaining Otherwise, the jury shall be discharged
and a new trial ordered
(0 When in the opinion of the court it is proper for the jury
to view the place in which the offense is alleged to have been
committed, or in which any other material fact occurred, it
may order them to be conducted in a body under the charge of
an officer to the place, which shall be shown to them by some
person appointed by the court for that purpose. The officer
shall be sworn that while the jury are thus conducted, he will
suffer no person other than the person so appointed to speak
to them nor to do so himself on any subject connected with the
trial and to return them into court without unnecessary delay
or at a specified time.
(j) At each recess of the court, whether the jurors are
permitted to separate or are sequestered, they shall be admonished by the court that it is their duty not to converse among
themselves or to converse with, or suffer themselves to be
addressed by, any other person on any subject of the trial, and
that it is their duty not to form or express an opinion thereon
until the case is finally submitted to them.
(k) Upon retiring for deliberation, the jury may take with
them the instructions of the court and all exhibits and papers
which have been received as evidence, except depositions, and
each juror may also take with him any4 notes of the testimony
or other proceedings taken by himself, but none taken by any
other person.
(1) When the case is finally submitted to the jury, they shall
be kept together in some convenient place under charge of an
officer until they agree upon a verdict or are discharged,
unless otherwise ordered by the court. Except by order of the
court, the officer having them under his charge shall not allow
any communication to be made to them, or make any himself,
except to ask them if they have agreed upon their verdict, and
he shall not, before the verdict is rendered, communicate to
any person the state of their deliberations or the verdict
agreed upon.
(m) After the jury has retired for deliberation, if they desire
to be informed on any point of law arising in the cause, they
shall inform the officer in charge of them, who shall communicate such request to the court. The court may then direct
that the jury be brought before the court where, in the
presence of the defendant and both counsel, the court shall
respond to the inquiry or advise the jury that no further
instructions shall be given. Such response shall be recorded.
The court may in its discretion respond to the inquiry in
writing without having the jury brought before the court, in
which case the inquiry and the response thereto shall be
entered in the record
(n) If the verdict rendered by a jury is incorrect on its face,
it may be corrected by the jury under the advice of the court,
or the jury may be sent out again

Rule 18

(0) At the conclusion of the evidence by the prosecution, or
at the conclusion of all the evidence, the court may issue an
order dismissing any information or indictment, or any count
thereof, upon the ground that the evidence is not legally
sufficient to establish the offense charged therein or any lesser
included offense
Rule 18. Selection of jury.
(a) The clerk shall draw by lot and call the number of the
jurors that are to try the cause plus such an additional
number as will allow for all peremptory challenges permitted
After each challenge for cause sustained, another juror shall
be called to fill the vacancy before further challenges are
made, and any such new juror may be challenged for cause
When the challenges for cause are completed, the clerk shall
make a list of the jurors remaining, and each side, beginning
with the prosecution, shall indicate thereon its peremptory
challenge to one juror at a time in regular turn, as the court
may direct, until all peremptory challenges are exhausted or
waived. The clerk shall then call the remaining jurors, or so
many of them as shall be necessary to constitute the jury, in
the order in which they appear on the list, and the persons
whose names are so called shall constitute the jury.
(b) The court may permit counsel or the defendant to
conduct the exammation of the prospective jurors or may itself
conduct the examination In the latter event, the court may
permit counsel or the defendant to supplement the examination by such further inquiry as it deems proper, or may itself
submit to the prospective jurors additional questions requested by counsel or the defendant.
(c) A challenge may be made to the panel or to an individual
juror
(1) The panel is a list of jurors called to serve at a particular
court or for the trial of a particular action A challenge to the
panel is an objection made to all jurors summoned and may be
taken by either party
d) A challenge to the panel can be founded only on a
material departure from the procedure prescribed with respect to the selection, drawing, summoning and return of the
panel.
(u) The challenge to the panel shall be taken before the jury
is sworn and shall be m writing or recorded by the reporter It
shall specifically set forth the facts constituting the grounds of
the challenge
(m) If a challenge to the panel is opposed by the adverse
party, a hearing may be had to try any question of fact upon
which the challenge is based. The jurors challenged, and any
other persons, may be called as witnesses at the hearing
thereon.
dv) The court shall decide the challenge If the challenge to
the panel is allowed, the court shall discharge the jury so far
as the trial in question is concerned. If a challenge is denied,
the court shall direct the selection of jurors to proceed.
(2) A challenge to an individual juror may be either peremptory or for cause. A challenge to an individual juror may be
made only before the jury is sworn to try the action, except the
court may, for good cause, permit it to be made after the juror
is sworn but before any of the evidence is presented In
challenges for cause the rules relating to challenges to a panel
and hearings thereon shall apply All challenges for cause
shall be taken first by the prosecution and then by the defense
(d) A peremptory challenge is an objection to a juror for
which no reason need be given In capital cases, each side is
entitled to 10 peremptory challenges. In other felony cases
each side is entitled to four peremptory challenges In misdemeanor cases, each side is entitled to three peremptory
challenges If there is more than one defendant the court may
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allow the defendants additional peremptory challenges and
permit them to be exercised separately or jointly
(e) The challenge for cause is an objection to a particular
juror and may be taken on one or more of the following
grounds
(1) want of any of the qualifications prescribed by law,
(2) any mental or physical infirmity which renders one
incapable of performing the duties of a juror
(3) consanguinity or affinity within the fourth degree to the
person alleged to be injured by the offense charged, or on
whose complaint the prosecution was instituted,
(4) the existence of any social, legal, business fiduciary or
other relationship between the prospective juror and any
party, witness or person alleged to have been victimized or
injured by the defendant, which relationship when viewed
objectively, would suggest to reasonable minds that the prospective juror would be unable or unwilling to return a verdict
which would be free of favoritism A prospective juror shall not
be disqualified solely because he is indebted to or employed by
the state or a political subdivision thereof,
(5) having been or being the party adverse to the defendant
in a civil action, or having complained against or having been
accused by him in a criminal prosecution,
(6) having served on the grand jury which found the indictment;
(7) having served on a trial jury which has tried another
person for the particular offense charged,
(8) having been one of a jury formally sworn to try the same
charge, and whose verdict was set aside, or which was discharged without a verdict after the case was submitted to it,
(9) having served as a juror in a civil action brought against
the defendant for the act charged as an offense,
(10) if the offense charged is punishable with death, the
entertaining of such conscientious opinions about the death
penalty as would preclude the juror from voting to impose the
death penalty following conviction regardless of the facts,
(11) because he is or within one year preceding, has been
engaged or interested in carrying on any business, calling or
employment, the carrying on of which is a violation of law,
where defendant is charged with a like offense,
(12) because he has been a witness, either for or against the
defendant on the preliminary examination or before the grand
jury,
(13) having formed or expressed an unqualified opinion or
belief as to whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty of the
offense charged, or
(14) that a state of mind exists on the part of the juror with
reference to the cause, or to either party, which will prevent
him from acting impartially and without prejudice to the
substantial rights of the party challenging, but no person shall
be disqualified as a juror by reason of having formed or
expressed an opinion upon the matter or cause to be submitted
to such jury, founded upon public rumor, statements in public
journals or common notonety, if it satisfactonly appears to the
court that the juror can and will, notwithstanding such
opinion, act impartially and fairly upon the matter to be
submitted to him
(f) Peremptory challenges shall be taken first by the prosecution and then by the defense alternately Challenges for
cause shall be completed before peremptory challenges are
taken
(g) The court may direct that alternate jurors be
impanelled Alternate jurors, in the order in which they are
called, shall replace jurors who are, or become, unable or
disqualified to perform their duties The prosecution and
defense shall each have one additional peremptory challenge
for each alternate juror to be chosen
Alternate jurors shall have the same qualifications, take the
same oath and enjoy the same pnvileges as regular jurors
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(h) A statutory exemption from service as a juror is a
privilege of the person exempted and is not a ground for
challenge for cause
(i) When the jurv is selected an oath shall be administered
to the jurors in substance, that they and each of them will
well and truly try the matter in issue between the parties and
render a true verdict according to the evidence and the
instructions of the court
Rule 19. Instructions.
(a) At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time as the
court reasonably directs, any party may file wntten request
that the court instruct the jury on the law as set forth in the
request At the same time copies of such requests shall be
furnished to the other parties The court shall inform counsel
of its proposed action upon the request and it shall furnish
counsel with a copy of its proposed instructions, unless the
parties stipulate that such instructions may be given orally, or
otherwise waive this requirement
(b) Upon each wntten request so presented and given, or
refused, the court shall endorse its decision and shall initial or
sign it If part be given and part refused, the court shall
distinguish, showing by the endorsement what part of the
charge was given and what part was refused
(c) No party may assign as error any portion of the charge
or omission therefrom unless he objects thereto before the jury
is instructed, stating distinctly the matter to which he objects
and the ground of his objection Notwithstanding a party's
failure to object, error may be assigned to instructions m order
to avoid a manifest injustice
(d) The court shall not comment on the evidence in the case,
and if the court refers to any of the evidence, it shall instruct
the jury that they are the exclusive judges of all questions of
fact
(e) Arguments of the respective parties shall be made after
the court has instructed the jury Unless otherwise provided
by law any limitation upon time for argument shall be within
the discretion of the court
Rule 20. Exceptions unnecessary.
Exceptions to rulings or orders of the court are unnecessary
It is sufficient that a party state his objections to the actions of
the court and the reasons therefor If a party has no opportunity to object to a ruling or order, the absence of an objection
hhall not thereafter prejudice him
Rule 21. Verdict
(a) The verdict of the jury shall be either "guilty3' ot "not
guilty," "not guilty by reason of insanity," "guilty and mentally
ill," or "not guilty of the cnme charged but guilty of a lesser
included offense," or "not guilty of the cnme charged but g'uilty
of a lesser included offense and mentally ill* provided that
when the defense of mental illness has been asserted and the
defendant is acquitted on the ground that he was insane at the
time of the commission of the offense charged, the verdict shall
be "not guilty by reason of insanity"
(b) The verdict shall be unanimous It shall be returned by
the jury to the judge in open court and in the presence of the
defendant and counsel If the defendant voluntanly absents
himself, the verdict may be received in his absence
(c) If there are two or more defendants, the jury at any time
dunng its deliberations may return a verdict or verdicts with
respect to any defendant as to whom it has agreed If the jury
cannot agree with respect to all, the defendant or defendants
aslo whom it does not agree may be tned again
(d) When the defendant may be convicted of more than one
offense charged, each offense of which the defendant is convicted shall be stated separately in the verdict

